This paper examines theoretically and empirically the role of political risk guarantees, which bilateral investment treaties serve, in debt accumulation in low and middle income countries. The paper empirically finds that signed bilateral investment treaties with OECD countries have a positive influence on total and guaranteed debt accumulation, under system GMM and OLS estimation methodologies. Results suggest that the role of bilateral investment treaties extends beyond attracting FDI to international lending.
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Introduction
The recent global financial crisis, which started with the US subprime crisis in February 2007 and spread to many European countries -Iceland, Belgium, Latvia, Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, and Spain -over the past five years, has created a squeeze in the supply of capital in international financial markets in general and in capital flows to low and middle income countries in particular. 1 The squeeze in capital flows was more obvious in debt flows than in foreign direct investment flows. Debt flows to low and middle income countries were more than halved between 2007 and 2009, while FDI flows were much less volatile, as the financial crisis literature predicts (Agenor 2003; Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann 2001; Stiglitz 2000) .
2,3
The sustainability of large capital inflows to emerging markets is one of the major challenges that the global economy faces in the aftermath of the crisis, as
Carmen Reinhart clearly pointed to in her keynote address "A Decade of Debt" to the 2012 INFINITI conference. 4 In fact this challenge is very relevant to the conference theme: "International Finance towards 2020: Will the next 10 years be different?"
In order to be able to sustain large capital inflows, in particular debt flows, to emerging markets, it is important to understand what mobilized debt flows over the past three decades, given two important observations. First, more than 80 percent and about 40 percent of low and middle income countries debt stocks, respectively, in 1 See the Council on Foreign Relations for a timeline of the global financial crisis (http://www.cfr.org/economics/timeline-global-economy-crisis/p18709). 3 See also Chuhan et al (1996) and Sarno and Taylor (1999) as in Agenor (2003) . 4 She also highlighted inflationary pressures, overheating and bubble risks as challenges for emerging markets. Public and private debt overhang, deleveraging, lower growth and high unemployment are highlighted challenges for advanced economies. Second, the paper conceptualizes the impact of bilateral investment treaties on international lending building on the literature on government guarantees of banks.
We conceptualize that bilateral investment treaties influence international lending through a) the impact on financial institutions in general and banks in particular, b) the design of treaties to primarily encourage FDI, c) promoting competition among countries to contract treaties, and d) financial contagion. This has not been done before to the best of our knowledge.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of three relevant strands in the literature -the determinants of capital flows, and the effect of investment treaties contracted by middle income countries have more positive influence than those by low income countries? 8 Developing countries include both low and middle income countries.
guarantees on risk taking and crises, and the impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. It then conceptualizes the mechanisms through which bilateral investment treaties impact international lending. Section 3 posits an optimization-driven empirical model following Wei and Wu (2001) . Section 4 proposes the estimation methodology in light of the empirical issues. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Literature survey

Determinants of capital flows and role of institutions
The determinants of capital flows have been extensively examined in the capital flows literature. Some studies, such as Brana and Lahet (2010) , Calvo et al (1996) and Fernandez-Arias (1996) , have distinguished between the external/push factors and the domestic/pull factors. Calvo et al (1996) Calvo et al (1996 ) Fernandez-Arias (1996 argued that the decline in world interest rates improved creditworthiness and reduced default risk in developing countries, and therefore perceived capital flows a result of the interaction between external push factors and domestic pull factors. Recently, Brana and Lahet (2010) expand the set of push factors in four Asian economies in 1990-2007 to include contagion variables -monsoonal effect, spillover effect and shift contagionas defined by Masson (1999 Other studies, which examine the influence of property rights protection on foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, include Alfaro et al (2008) , Asiedu (2006) , Busse and Hefeker (2007) , Daude and Fratzscher (2008) , Daude and Stein (2007) , Du et al (2008) , Faria and Mauro (2009) , Mishra and Daly (2007) , Naude and Krugell (2007) , and Wei (2000) . Studies on international lending include Kraay and Nehru (2004) , Lane (2004) , Mina (2011 ), Mina (2006 , and Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) . The empirical evidence of these studies suggests that better domestic institutional functions encourage capital inflows and tilt the capital structure of countries towards equity and away from debt. 10 He focuses on common global liquidity, risk, and macroeconomic news shocks. 11 They use Price Waterhouse Coopers' opacity index covering corruption, legal, economic, accounting/reporting, and regulation opacity as well as aggregate opacity. In summary this section identifies three messages. First, political risk matters for capital flows. Poor institutions and high risk of investment expropriation deter both bank loans and portfolio flows. Second, institutional quality, country risk, and the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals and policies matter for insulation and recovery from global shocks. Third, the literature has not considered government efforts to strengthen property rights protection and reduce political risk, through bilateral investment treaties, and their influence on international lending.
Effect of guarantees on risk taking and crises
This section weaves the literature on the effect of guarantees on financial institutions, in particular banks, risk taking behavior and on financial crises. In doing so, we aim to gain an insight into how bilateral investment treaties, through political risk guarantees, might affect financial institutions' international lending decisions.
Government guarantees affect bank risk taking behavior through two opposing channels (Gropp et al 2012) . On the one hand guarantees reduce market discipline and creditors' incentives to monitor bank risk taking, and therefore generate more bank risk taking. On the other hand they increase banks' charter or franchise value. 12 A government guarantee increases the present value of future profits, resulting in higher opportunity cost of closing down. In order not to forego future profits, banks would reduce risk taking. Whether guarantees at the firm level result in more or less risk taking depends on the strength of each of these two opposing forces.
In 14 The influence of bilateral investment treaties on FDI has also been examined in Desbordes and Vicard (2009), Egger and Merlo (2007) , Hallward and Driemeier (2003) , Kerner (2009 ), Mina (2009 , and UNCTAD (1998).
The second mechanism lies in the institutional or legal design of treaties.
Being primarily designed to protect and encourage FDI, bilateral investment treaties may tilt the composition of capital flows in favor of equity as opposed to debt. This in turn may reduce the likelihood of banking crisis -a macroeconomic risk, which may encourage future international lending.
Competition among countries to sign bilateral investment treaties to attract international lending may reduce the level and/or share that a country can attract -a third mechanism. 15 Recognizing the benefits of bilateral investment treaties, countries may compete against each other to sign treaties with other higher income countries to be able to attract higher level and/or share of world capital flows. In other words, the competition to sign bilateral investment treaties and reduce political risk manifests In summary, we conceptualize that bilateral investment treaties influence international lending through their impact on financial institutions in general and banks in particular, their design that primarily encourages FDI, the resulting competition among countries to contract treaties, and financial contagion. We leave the empirical examination of each of these mechanisms or channels for future research.
Empirical model and data
Empirical model specification builds on Wei and Wu (2001) , who examine the effect of corruption on FDI. Their empirical model is motivated by a simple optimization problem solved by a multinational firm. Similarly, we can conceptualize a foreign creditor (bank) optimization problem in which it selects the level of loans it extends to borrowing countries, j=1,…,N, that maximizes its profit π. The optimization problem can be expressed as:
where is foreign creditor's profit, is the rate of government expropriation of foreign investment, is the rate of political risk guarantee on a dollar of lending, is the rate of default on loans, is the stock of loans the foreign creditor extends to the borrowing or borrower's country, and is the creditor's cost of loanable funds. The optimal stock of loans a foreign creditor extends to a country j thus depends on the borrowing country's rate of government expropriation of foreign investment, the rate of political risk guarantee a country provides through the bilateral investment treaty it contracts, the rate of loan default, and the cost of loanable funds to the foreign creditor or deposit interest rate.
[ ] where , , , and .
The empirical model expresses, in principle, the stock of foreign loans (L) as:
where L, G, P, D, and I are as defined above but in capital letters, and M i,t is the cost of exclusion from international capital markets, and ε an error term. 17, 18 The subscripts i and t are country and time indicators.
L is the stock of external debt owed to nonresidents, which comprises public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) and private non-guaranteed (PNG), the use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Both PPG and PNG are long-term in nature. PPG comprises the external obligations of public sector, or private sector whose debt is guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. 19 PNG comprises the external obligations 17 Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) estimates the level of international debt using the cost of debt default, the level of income, the growth rate of income, population size, and the real level of public debt. Cost of debt default arise from embargoes on future lending and is measured by exports variability and the ratio of imports to GNP. The level of income and income growth rate are measured by GNP and GNP growth rate, respectively. 18 Initially we considered a vector of explanatory variables, which includes the degrees of economic and financial development, as measured by real GDP per capita and private sector credit relative to GDP, in this vector. However, these two variables are captured in sovereign credit rating, and together with investment profile and FDI flows explain about 36 percent of the variation in the rating. 19 The public sector includes the general government, monetary authorities, and public corporations. A public corporation, financial or nonfinancial, is subject to control by government units, where control over a corporation is defined as the ability to determine general corporate policy by choosing appropriate directors, if necessary. Control can be established through government ownership of more than half of the voting shares or more than half of the shareholder voting power (including through of private debtors, which are not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. We should note that S&P's sovereign credit rating is based on five scores: political, economic, external, fiscal, and monetary. The political score measures institutional effectiveness and political risks, which intuitively include the risk of investment expropriation, G. Empirically, as mentioned in the footnote above, ownership of a second public corporation that in turn has a majority of the voting shares), or through special legislation, decree, or regulation that empowers the government to determine corporate policy or to appoint directors. The publicly guaranteed private sector external debt component of PPG is defined as the external debt liabilities of the private sector, the servicing of which is contractually guaranteed by a public entity resident in the same economy as the debtor. Private sector external debt, which is not contractually guaranteed by the public sector is classified as PNG. 
Empirical issues and estimation methodology
Empirical issues
There are two major empirical issues that we take into account. First, due to the stock nature of the dependent variable, non-stationarity is a likely empirical issue.
We conducted an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the total debt stock and its PPG and PNG components. The unit root null hypothesis was rejected at the 1 percent level, whether an intercept, or an intercept with a trend are included in the regression.
The null hypothesis was also rejected for the total debt stock and PPG in per capita terms. For PNG per capita, we failed to reject the unit root null at the 10 percent significance level; when the variable was first differenced, the null was rejected.
Unit root tests were also undertaken for the explanatory variables. For all but imports of goods and services relative to GDP, the unit root null hypothesis was rejected indicating stationarity. The unit root null hypothesis was rejected when the variable was first differenced.
Second, simultaneity is a potential issue. Thus Granger causality tests have been conducted. Test results for two lag lengths are reported in table 1 below, with arrows specifying direction of causality. Results also show for four lag length that total debt stock, PPG, and PPG per capita Granger cause total signed treaties with OECD countries. To address non-stationarity and endogeneity arising from simultaneity, we adopt a system GMM approach as explained in the following section. 
Estimation methodology
To address endogeneity, we adopt a dynamic panel GMM approach in estimating the empirical model along the line of Arellano and Bond (1991) . 24 To explain the GMM estimator, consider the following empirical model: 
Although unobservable country effect is eliminated with differencing, there can still be an endogneity bias arising from the correlation between the lagged difference of the dependent variable and the error term. In this case instrumental variables are used.
The difference GMM estimator uses the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments on the conditions that the error term of the differenced equation is not serially correlated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. The moment conditions therefore are written as:
When the dependent variable is highly persistent over time, the difference GMM suffers weak instrument problem and its asymptotic properties may be affected.
In this case Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) the difference GMM estimator is augmented with estimation of the levels equation (equation 2) to produce system GMM estimator. For this equation, lagged differences of explanatory variables are used as instruments, assuming the absence of serial correlation in the error term, and between these instruments and the error term. The moment conditions are thus written as:
To ensure that the moment conditions (4-7) are satisfied, we test the lack of secondorder serial correlation and use the Hansen/Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions to test for instrument validity. Table 2 provides mean debt stock for the sample countries. Among the middle income countries, Russia has the highest level of total debt, whether PPG or PNG. Its total debt amount for about $205 billion, of which $112 billion or 55 percent is PPG.
Empirical results
On the other extreme, Botswana has the lowest level of debt stock of $0.54 billion, of which $0.51 billion or 94 percent in PPG. The highest percentage of PNG debt is in Kazakhstan with 82 percent. In per capita terms, Latvia has the highest total and PNG debt at about $5,700 and $2,700, respectively, while Panama has the highest PPG debt at about $1,900. In contrast, India and China have the lowest total and PPG debt at nearly $100 and $50, respectively. Among the low income countries, Bangladesh has the highest average of nearly $14 billion, of which nearly $13 billion or 93 percent is PPG. The highest share of PNG debt is in Mozambique, which stands at 12 percent. Table 3 , 4, and 5 present the estimation results using OLS, fixed effects, and the two-step system GMM estimation respectively. All estimates show high persistence in debt. OLS estimates show positive and statistically significant coefficient of political risk guarantee and default risk. For example in column 1 an increase in the number of treaties by 1 increases debt accumulation by US$ 0.4 billion, and an improvement in sovereign credit rating score by 1 increases it by US$1.4 billion. An increase in the cost of loanable funds reduces total and PPG debt stock and in per capita terms as well.
Compared to OLS estimates, the fixed effects coefficients of political risk guarantees are statistically significant only in total and per capita PNG debt. An improvement in default risk increases total and PNG debt accumulation only. The negative and statistically significant effect of costs of loanable funds is experienced also for total and PNG debt only.
The system GMM estimation methodology is valid as suggested by the results of the Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation, the Hansen J statistic, and the difference Hansen J statistic. The Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation (AR2) suggests that there is no autocorrelation of order 2 in the error term. Testing for over-identifying restrictions, the Hansen J statistic suggests that the instruments, as a group, are uncorrelated with the error term, and thus appear exogenous, and the difference
Hansen J statistic suggests that there is no correlation between the lagged differences of the explanatory variables and the error terms. We should note that due to the proliferation of instruments, we are reporting system GMM estimates, which are GMM estimates of the lagged dependent variable are closer to the OLS than to the fixed effects estimates for total and PPG debt (and in per capita terms). The coefficients of PNG debt and PNG debt per capita are very different, however. For the former, it exceeds 1 and for the latter it is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
The coefficients of political risk guarantee are much higher than the OLS and fixed effects coefficients. For example, an increase in the total number of bilateral investment treaties increases total and PPG debt by US$3.4 billion and US$ 2.3 billion, respectively, compared to OLS of US$ 0.4 billion and US$ 0.3 billion.
For default risk coefficients, GMM estimates stand in striking difference from the OLS and fixed effects estimates. All of them are negative and most of them are statistically insignificant. P is the rate of political risk guarantee, proxied by the total number of bilateral investment treaties signed with OECD countries. D is the rate of default on loans measured by S&P sovereign credit rating. I is the cost of loanable funds measured by 12-month Euro dollar LIBOR. M is the cost of exclusion from international capital markets proxied by percentage of imports of goods and services to GDPG. GMM instruments are the lagged dependent variable and the total number of bilateral investment treaties signed with OECD countries. IV instruments are the percent of public spending on education to GDP, total health expenditures to GDP, and (log) FDI stock. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
Conclusion
This paper has started off with the challenge of sustainable large capital inflows that emerging markets face in the aftermath of the global financial crisis starting 2007. To sustain debt flows, it is important to understand its debt determinants taking into account the importance of guaranteed debt in debt composition and the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties as a means to guarantee political risk and promote financial integration. The paper conceptualizes a number of mechanisms through which bilateral investment treaties can influence international lending. The paper empirically finds that signed bilateral investment treaties with OECD countries have a positive influence on total and guaranteed debt accumulation, under system GMM and OLS estimation methodologies.
The results of the paper show creditors extending guaranteed loans positively respond to political risk guarantees of bilateral investment treaties, suggesting complementarity of guarantees against default and political risk for low and middle income countries. The evidence for non-guaranteed loans calls for further investigations, however. Finally the results suggest that the role of bilateral investment treaties extends beyond attracting FDI to international lending.
Appendix A S&P Letter Credit Rating Transformation Methodology
Transforming S&P's foreign currency, long-term debt credit rating into numerical scores follows the scoring system provided in the table below. Foreign currency, as opposed to local currency, rating is selected based on the assumption that low and middle income countries' investment and trade finance needs are mostly in foreign currency. Long, as opposed to short, term rating is selected due to the longterm nature of PPG and PNG debt, as discussed in section 4. S&P ratings are obtained from S&P's "Sovereign Rating And Country T&C Assessment Histories" issued on September 10, 2012, which covers historical ratings as of August 31, 2012. 25 The score that a country gets in a given year is the average of assigned ratings throughout the year weighted by the number of months for which the rating(s) held.
For example, if a country was assigned "AAA" rating for any six months during the year, and "AA" for the remaining six months, the numerical score is 9.5, which is calculated as [10*(6/12)]+[9*(6/12)].
We should note that counting the number of months to which a rating is assigned is inclusive of that month. For example, if an "A" rating is assigned in March and lasts until December of the same year, then the rating applies to 10 months. Also, if for any given month two different scores is assigned, the score that lasts for more number of days applies to that month.
Unlike Kim and Wu (2008) and Gande and Parsley (2005), we do not account for outlook in rating transformation. This is for two reasons. First, if the outlook is realized and therefore reflected in the next rating, the weighted average scoring methodology will account for the realized outlook. Second, the majority of low income countries and nearly half of middle income countries foreign debt is PPG, the response of which to sovereign rating is statistically insignificant. 
